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Abstract
Privacy amplification is the art of shrinking a partially secret string Z to a highly
secret key S. We show that, even if an adversary holds quantum information about the
initial string Z, the key S obtained by two-universal hashing is secure, according to a
universally composable security definition. Additionally, we give an asymptotically optimal
lower bound on the length of the extractable key S in terms of the adversary’s (quantum)
knowledge about Z. Our result has applications in quantum cryptography. In particular,
it implies that many of the known quantum key distribution protocols are universally
composable.
1 Introduction
1.1 Privacy amplification
Consider two parties having access to a common string Z about which an adversary might
have some partial information. Privacy amplification, introduced by Bennett, Brassard, and
Robert [1], is the art of transforming this partially secure string Z into a highly secret key S
by public discussion. A good technique is to compute S as the output of a publicly chosen
two-universal hash function1 F applied to Z. Indeed, it has been shown [1, 2, 3] that, if the
adversary holds purely classical information W about Z, this method yields a secure key S
and, additionally, is asymptotically optimal with respect to the length of S. For instance, if
both the initial string Z and the adversary’s knowledge W consist of many independent and
identically distributed parts, the number of extractable key bits roughly equals the conditional
Shannon entropy H(Z|W ).
The analysis of privacy amplification can be extended to a situation where the adversary
might hold quantum instead of only classical information about Z. It has been shown [4] that
two-universal hashing allows for the extraction of a secure key S whose length roughly equals the
∗This work was partially supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation, project No. 20-66716.01.
1See Section 2.1 for a definition of two-universal functions.
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difference between the entropy of Z and the number of qubits stored by the adversary. This
can be applied to proving the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols where
privacy amplification is used for the classical post-processing of the (only partially secure) raw
key [5].
1.2 Universal composability
Cryptographic protocols (e.g., for generating a secret key) are often used as components within
a larger system (where, e.g., the secret key is used to encrypt messages). It is thus natural to
require that the security of a protocol is not compromised when it is, e.g., invoked as a sub-
protocol in any (arbitrarily complex) scheme. This requirement is captured by the notion of
universal composability. Roughly speaking, a cryptographic protocol is said to be universally
composable if it is secure in any arbitrary context. For instance, the universal composability
of a secret key S guarantees that any bit of S remains secret even if some other part of S is
given to an adversary.2
In the past few years, composable security has attracted a lot of interest and lead to
important new definitions and proofs (see, e.g., the framework of Canetti [6] or Pfitzmann
and Waidner [7]). Recently, Ben-Or and Mayers have generalized the notion of universal
composability to the quantum case [8]. Universally composable security definitions are usually
based on the idea of characterizing the security of a cryptographic scheme by its distance to an
ideal system which (by definition) is perfectly secure. For instance, a secret key S is universally
composable if it is close to an independent and almost uniformly distributed string U . This
then implies that any cryptosystem which is proven secure when using a perfect key U remains
secure when U is replaced by the (real) key S.
Ben-Or, Horodecki, Leung, Mayers, and Oppenheim [9] were the first to address the problem
of universal composability in the context of QKD. Usually, the security of a QKD scheme is
defined by the requirement that the mutual information between the final key S and the
outcome of an arbitrary measurement of the adversary’s quantum system be small (for a formal
definition, see, e.g., [10] or [11]). This, however, does not necessarily imply composability.
Indeed, an adversary might wait with the measurement of his quantum state until he learns
some of the bits of S, which might allow him to obtain more information about the remaining
bits.
1.3 Contributions
We analyze the security of privacy amplification in a setting where an adversary holds quantum
information. We show that the key obtained by two-universal hashing is secure according to a
very strong security definition which, in any context, guarantees virtually the same security as
a perfect key. The security definition we use is essentially equivalent to the definition used in [9]
for analyzing the composability of QKD, and thus also provides universal composability with
respect to the framework of [8] (cf. Section 3). This extends the result of [4] where a weaker
(not necessarily composable) security definition has been used. Moreover, our results have
2Note that this is not necessarily the case for many known security definitions of a secret key.
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implications for quantum cryptography. In particular, it follows from the analysis in [5] (which
is based on the security of privacy amplification) that many of the known QKD protocols (such
as BB84 [12] or B92 [13]) are universally composable (cf. Section 4.4 for more details).
Additionally, we improve the lower bound on the length of the extractable key S given
in [4]. If the initial information Z as well as the adversary’s (quantum) knowledge consist of n
independent pieces, our bound is asymptotically tight, for n approaching infinity. In particular,
we obtain an explicit expression (in terms of von Neumann entropy) for the rate at which secret
key bits can be generated, thus generalizing a result which has only been known for the case
of purely classical adversaries (cf. Section 4.3).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Random functions and two-universal functions
A random function from X to Y is a random variable taking values from the set of functions
with domain X and range Y. A random function F from X to Y is called two-universal if
Pr[F (x) = F (x′)] ≤ 1|Y| ,
for any distinct x, x′ ∈ X .3 In particular, F is two-universal if, for any distinct x, x′ ∈ X , the
random variables F (x) and F (x′) are independent and uniformly distributed. For instance, the
random function chosen uniformly from the set of all functions from X to Y is two-universal.
Non-trivial examples of two-universal functions can, e.g., be found in [14] and [15].
2.2 Density operators and random states
Let H be a Hilbert space. We denote by S(H) the set of density operators on H, i.e., S(H) is
the set of positive operators ρ on H with tr(ρ) = 1. A density operator ρ ∈ S(H) is called pure
if it has rank 1, i.e., ρ = |φ〉〈φ| for some |φ〉 ∈ H.
Let (Ω, P ) be a discrete probability space. A random state ρ on H is a random variable
with range S(H), i.e., a function from Ω to S(H). Let ρ and ρ′ be two random states on H
and H′, respectively. The tensor product ρ ⊗ ρ′ of ρ and ρ′ is the random state on H ⊗ H′
defined by
(ρ⊗ ρ′)(ω) := ρ(ω)⊗ ρ′(ω) ,
for any ω ∈ Ω.
To describe settings involving both classical and quantum information, it is often convenient
to represent classical information as a state of a quantum system. Let X be a random variable
with range X and let H be a |X |-dimensional Hilbert space with orthonormal basis {|x〉}x∈X .
The random state representation of X, denoted {X}, is the random state on H defined by
{X} := |X〉〈X|, i.e., for any ω ∈ Ω,
{X}(ω) = |X(ω)〉〈X(ω)| .
3In the literature, two-universality is usually defined for families F of functions: A family F is called two-
universal if the random function F with uniform distribution over F is two-universal.
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Let ρ be a random state. For an observer which is ignorant of the randomness of ρ, the density
operator of the quantum system described by ρ is given by
[ρ] := Eρ[ρ] =
∑
ω∈Ω
P (ω)ρ(ω) .
More generally, for any event E , the density operator of ρ conditioned on E , denoted [ρ|E ], is
defined by
[ρ|E ] := Eρ[ρ|E ] = 1
Pr[E ]
∑
ω∈E
P (ω)ρ(ω) .
Let ρ ⊗ {X} be a random state consisting of a classical part {X} specified by a random
variable X. It is easy to see that the corresponding density operator [ρ⊗ {X}] is given by
[ρ⊗ {X}] = EX
[
ρX ⊗ |X〉〈X|
]
(1)
where ρx := [ρ|X = x]. In particular, if X is independent of ρ, then
[ρ⊗ {X}] = [ρ]⊗ [{X}] . (2)
2.3 Distance measures and non-uniformity
The variational distance between two probability distributions P and Q over the same range
X is defined as
δ(P,Q) :=
1
2
∑
x∈X
|P (x)−Q(x)| .
The variational distance between two probability distributions P and Q can be interpreted as
the probability that two random experiments described by P and Q, respectively, are different.
This is formalized by the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1. Let P and Q be two probability distributions. Then there exists a pair of random
variables X and X ′ with joint probability distribution PXX′ such that PX = P , PX′ = Q, and
Pr[X 6= X ′] = δ(P,Q) .
The trace distance between two density operators ρ and σ on the same Hilbert space H is
defined as
δ(ρ, σ) :=
1
2
tr(|ρ− σ|) .
The trace distance is a metric on the set of density operators S(H). We say that ρ is ε-close
to σ if δ(ρ, σ) ≤ ε, and denote by Bε(ρ) the set of density operators which are ε-close to ρ, i.e.,
Bε(ρ) = {σ ∈ S(H) : δ(ρ, σ) ≤ ε}.
The trace distance is subadditive with respect to the tensor product, i.e., for any ρ, σ ∈ S(H)
and ρ′, σ′ ∈ S(H′),
δ(ρ ⊗ ρ′, σ ⊗ σ′) ≤ δ(ρ, σ) + δ(ρ′, σ′) , (3)
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with equality if ρ′ = σ′, i.e.,
δ(ρ⊗ ρ′, σ ⊗ ρ′) = δ(ρ, σ) . (4)
Moreover, it cannot increase when the same quantum operation E is applied to both arguments,
i.e.,
δ(E(ρ), E(σ)) ≤ δ(ρ, σ) . (5)
Similarly, the trace distance between ρ and σ is an upper bound for the variational distance
between the probability distributions P and Q of the outcomes when applying the same mea-
surement to ρ and σ, respectively, i.e.,
δ(P,Q) ≤ δ(ρ, σ) . (6)
The variational distance can be seen as a (classical) special case of the trace distance. Let X
and Y be random variables. Then the variational distance between the probability distributions
of X and Y equals the trace distance between the corresponding density matrices [{X}] and
[{Y }], i.e.,
δ(PX , PY ) = δ([{X}], [{Y }]) .
The trace distance between two density operators containing a representation of the same
classical random variable X can be written as the expectation of the trace distance between
the density operators conditioned on X.
Lemma 2.2. Let X be a random variable and let ρ and σ be random states. Then
δ([ρ ⊗ {X}], [σ ⊗ {X}]) = EX [δ(ρX , σX)]
where ρx := [ρ|X = x] and σx := [σ|X = x]).
Proof. Using (1) and the orthogonality of the vectors |x〉, we obtain
δ([ρ ⊗ {X}], [σ ⊗ {X}]) = 1
2
tr
∣∣∣EX[(ρX − σX)⊗ |X〉〈X|]∣∣∣ = 1
2
tr
(
EX
[∣∣(ρX − σX)⊗ |X〉〈X|∣∣]) .
The assertion then follows from the linearity of the trace and the fact that tr
∣∣(ρx−σx)⊗|x〉〈x|∣∣ =
tr|ρx − σx|.
In Section 3, we will see that a natural measure for characterizing the secrecy of a key is
its trace distance to a uniform distribution.
Definition 2.3. Let X be a random variable with range X and let ρ be a random state. The
non-uniformity of X given ρ is defined by
d(X|ρ) := δ([{X} ⊗ ρ], [{U}] ⊗ [ρ])
where U is a random variable uniformly distributed on X .
Note that d(X|ρ) = 0 if and only if X is uniformly distributed and independent of ρ.
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2.4 (Smooth) Re´nyi entropy
Let ρ ∈ S(H) be a density operator and let α ∈ [0,∞]. The Re´nyi entropy of order α of ρ is
defined by
Sα(ρ) :=
1
1− α log2
(
tr(ρα)
)
with the convention Sα(ρ) := limβ→α Sβ(ρ) for α ∈ {0, 1,∞}. In particular, for α = 0,
S0(ρ) = log2
(
rank(ρ)
)
and, for α = ∞, S∞(ρ) = − log2
(
λmax(ρ)
)
where λmax(ρ) denotes the
maximum eigenvalue of ρ. For α = 1, Sα(ρ) is equal to the von Neumann entropy S(ρ).
Moreover, for α, β ∈ [0,∞],
α ≤ β ⇐⇒ Sα(ρ) ≥ Sβ(ρ) . (7)
Note that, for a classical random variable X, the Re´nyi entropy Sα([{X}]) of the quantum
representation of X corresponds to the Re´nyi entropy Hα(X) of X as defined in classical
information theory [16].
The definition of Re´nyi entropy for density operators can be generalized to the notion of
smooth Re´nyi entropy, which has been introduced in [17] for the case of classical probability
distributions.
Definition 2.4. Let ρ ∈ S(H), let α ∈ [0,∞], and let ε ≥ 0. The ε-smooth Re´nyi entropy of
order α of ρ is defined by
Sεα(ρ) :=
1
1− α log2
(
inf
σ∈Bε(ρ)
tr(σα)
)
with the convention Sεα(ρ) := limβ→α S
ε
β(ρ), for α = 0 or α =∞, and Sε1(ρ) := S(ρ).
The smooth Re´nyi entropy of order α can easily be expressed in terms of conventional Re´nyi
entropy. In particular, for α = 0,
Sε0(ρ) = inf
σ∈Bε(ρ)
S0(σ) (8)
and, for α =∞,
Sε∞(ρ) = sup
σ∈Bε(ρ)
S∞(σ) . (9)
The following lemma is a direct generalization of the corresponding classical statement
in [17], saying that, for any order α, the smooth Re´nyi entropy Hεα(W ) of a random variable
W consisting of many independent and identically distributed pieces asymptotically equals its
Shannon entropy H(W ).
Lemma 2.5. Let ρ be a density operator. Then, for any α ∈ [0,∞],
lim
ε→0
lim
n→∞
Sεα(ρ
⊗n)
n
= S(ρ) .
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3 Secret keys and composability
The main idea for obtaining universally composable security definitions is to compare the
behavior of a real cryptographic protocol with an ideal functionality. For a protocol which is
supposed to generate a secret key S, this ideal functionality is simply a source which outputs an
independent and uniformly distributed random variable U (in particular, U is fully independent
of the adversary’s information). This motivates the following definition.
Definition 3.1. Let S be a random variable, let ρ be a random state, and let ε ≥ 0. S is said
to be an ε-secure secret key with respect to ρ if
d(S|ρ) ≤ ε .
Consider a situation where S is used as a secret key and where the adversary’s information
is given by a random state ρ. The ε-security of S with respect to ρ guarantees that this
situation (which is described by the density operator [ρ⊗{S}]) is ε-close—with respect to the
trace distance—to an ideal setting (described by [ρ ⊗ {U}]) where S is replaced by a perfect
key U which is uniformly distributed and independent of ρ. Since the trace distance does
not increase when appending an additional quantum system (cf. (4)) or when applying any
arbitrary quantum operation (cf. (5)), this also holds for any further evolution of the system.
In particular, it follows from (6) and Lemma 2.1 that the real and the ideal setting can be
considered to be identical with probability at least 1− ε.
Definition 3.1 is essentially equivalent to an intermediate definition which has been used
in [9] to prove the universal composability of QKD. More precisely, if S is ε-secure according to
Definition 3.1, it satisfies the security definition of [9] for some ε′ depending on ε.4 It is thus an
immediate consequence of the results in [9] that Definition 3.1 provides universal composability
in the framework of [8].
Note that Definition 3.1 can also be seen as a natural generalization of classical security
definitions based on the variational distance (which is the classical analogue of the trace dis-
tance). Indeed, if the adversary’s knowledge is purely classical, Definition 3.1 is equivalent to
the security definition as it is, e.g., used in [19] or [4].
4 Main result
4.1 Theorem and proof
Theorem 4.1. Let Z be a random variable with range Z, let ρ be a random state, and let F be
a two-universal function on Z with range S = {0, 1}s which is independent of Z and ρ. Then
d(F (Z)|{F} ⊗ ρ) ≤ 1
2
2−
1
2
(S2([{Z}⊗ρ])−S0([ρ])−s) .
4In [9], a key S about which an adversary has information ρs is defined to be secure (with parameter ε
′) if the
Shannon distinguishability SD between ρ1 :=
∑
s
PS(s)|s〉〈s|⊗ρs and ρ0 :=
∑
s
1
|S|
|s〉〈s|⊗ρ′, for ρ′ :=
∑
s
1
|S|
ρs,
is small, i.e., ε′ = SD(ρ1, ρ0). The relation between ε and ε
′ thus follows from the relation between the trace
distance and the Shannon distance (see, e.g., [18]).
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The following corollary is a consequence of property (7), expressions (8) and (9), and the
triangle inequality for the trace distance.
Corollary 4.2. Let Z be a random variable with range Z, let ρ be a random state, let F be a
two-universal function on Z with range S = {0, 1}s which is independent of Z and ρ, and let
ε ≥ 0. Then
d(F (Z)|{F} ⊗ ρ) ≤ 1
2
2−
1
2
(Sε∞([{Z}⊗ρ])−S
ε
0([ρ])−s) + 2ε .
Let us first state some technical lemmas to be used for the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Lemma 4.3. Let Z be a random variable with range Z, let ρ be a random state, and let F be
a random function with domain Z which is independent of Z and ρ. Then
d(F (Z)|{F} ⊗ ρ) = EF [d(F (Z)|ρ)].
Proof. Let U be a random variable uniformly distributed on Z and independent of F and ρ.
Then
d(F (Z)|ρ ⊗ {F}) = δ ([({F (Z)} ⊗ ρ)⊗ {F}], [({U} ⊗ ρ)⊗ {F}]) ,
Now, applying Lemma 2.2 to the random states {F (Z)} ⊗ ρ and {U} ⊗ ρ gives the desired
result, since
[{F (Z)} ⊗ ρ|F = f ] = [{f(Z)} ⊗ ρ]
[{U} ⊗ ρ|F = f ] = [{U}]⊗ [ρ]
which holds because F is independent of Z, ρ, and U .
The following lemmas can most easily be formalized in terms of the square of the Hilbert-
Schmidt distance. For two density operators ρ and σ, let
∆(ρ, σ) := tr
(
(ρ− σ)2) .
Moreover, for a random variable X with range X and a random state ρ, we define
D(X|ρ) := ∆([{X} ⊗ ρ], [{U}] ⊗ [ρ])
where U is a random variable uniformly distributed on X .
Lemma 4.4. Let ρ and σ be two density operators on H. Then
δ(ρ, σ) ≤ 1
2
√
rank(ρ− σ) ·∆(ρ, σ) .
Proof. The assertion follows directly from Lemma A.2 and the definition of the distance mea-
sures δ(·, ·) and ∆(·, ·).
Lemma 4.5. Let X be a random variable with range X and let ρ be a random state. Then
d(X|ρ) ≤ 1
2
2
S0([ρ])
2
√
|X | ·D(X|ρ).
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Proof. This is an immediate consequence of the definitions and Lemma 4.4.
Lemma 4.6. Let X be a random variable with range X and let ρ be a random state. Then
D(X|ρ) = tr
((∑
x∈X
PX(x)
2ρ2x
)− 1|X | [ρ]2
)
where ρx := [ρ|X = x] for x ∈ X .
Proof. From (1), we have
D(X|ρ) = tr

(∑
x∈X
PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρx − 1|X |
∑
x∈X
|x〉〈x| ⊗ [ρ]
)2
= tr
(∑
x∈X
(
PX(x)ρx − 1|X | [ρ]
)2)
= tr
(∑
x∈X
PX(x)
2ρ2x −
2
|X | [ρ]
∑
x∈X
PX(x)ρx +
1
|X | [ρ]
2.
)
.
Inserting the identity
[ρ] =
∑
x∈X
PX(x)ρx
concludes the proof.
Lemma 4.7. Let Z be a random variable with range Z, let ρ be a random state, and let F be
a two-universal function on Z chosen independently of Z and ρ. Then
EF [D(F (Z)|ρ)] ≤ 2−S2([{Z}⊗ρ]) .
Proof. Let us define ρz := [ρ|Z = z] for every z ∈ Z and let S be the range of F . With
Lemma 4.6, we obtain
EF [D(F (Z)|ρ)] = tr
(
EF
[∑
s∈S
Pr[F (Z) = s]2[ρ|F (Z) = s]2
])
− 1|S|tr([ρ]
2) , (10)
using the linearity of the expectation value and the trace. Note that
Pr[f(Z) = s] · [ρ|f(Z) = s] =
∑
z∈f−1({s})
PZ(z)ρz .
Using this identity and rearranging the summation order, we get∑
s∈S
Pr[f(Z) = s]2[ρ|f(Z) = s]2 =
∑
z,z′∈Z
PZ(z)PZ(z
′)ρzρz′δf(z),f(z′) ,
9
where δx,y is the Kronecker delta which equals 1 if x = y and 0 otherwise. Taking the expec-
tation value over the random choice of F then gives
EF
[∑
s∈S
Pr[F (Z) = s]2[ρ|F (Z) = s]2
]
=
∑
z,z′∈Z
PZ(z)PZ(z
′)ρzρz′ Pr[F (z) = F (z
′)] .
Similarly, we obtain
[ρ]2 =
∑
z,z′∈Z
PZ(z)PZ(z
′)ρzρz′ .
Inserting this into (10), we get
EF [D(F (Z)|ρ)] =
∑
z,z′∈Z
PZ(z)PZ(z
′)
(
Pr[F (z) = F (z′)]− 1|S|
)
tr(ρzρz′) .
As we assumed that F is two-universal, all summands with z 6= z′ are not larger than zero and
we are left with
EF [D(F (Z)|ρ)] ≤
∑
z∈Z
PZ(z)
2tr(ρ2z) = tr
(
[{Z} ⊗ ρ]2)
from which the assertion follows by the definition of the Re´nyi entropy S2.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Using Lemma 4.3, Lemma 4.5, we get
d(F (Z)|{F} ⊗ ρ) = EF [d(F (Z)|ρ)]
≤ 1
2
2
s+S0([ρ])
2 EF [
√
D(F (Z)|ρ)]
≤ 1
2
2
s+S0([ρ])
2
√
EF [D(F (Z)|ρ)] .
where the last inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality and the convexity of the square root.
Applying Lemma 4.7 concludes the proof.
4.2 Privacy amplification against quantum adversaries
We now apply the results of the previous section to show that privacy amplification by two-
universal hashing is secure (with respect to the universally composable security definition of
Section 3) against an adversary holding quantum information. Consider two distant parties
which are connected by an authentic, but otherwise fully insecure classical communication
channel. Additionally, they have access to a common random string Z about which an ad-
versary has some partial information represented by the state ρ of a quantum system. The
two legitimate parties can apply the following privacy amplification protocol to obtain a secure
key S: One of the parties chooses an instance of a two-universal function F and announces his
choice to the other party using the public communication channel. Then, both parties compute
S = F (Z). Since the information of the adversary after the execution of the protocol is given
by ρ⊗{F}, one wants the final key S to be ε-secure with respect to ρ⊗{F} (cf. Definition 3.1),
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for some small ε ≥ 0. It is an immediate consequence of Corollary 4.2 that this is achieved if
the key S has length at most
s = S ε¯∞([{Z} ⊗ ρ])− S ε¯0([ρ])− 2 log2(
1
4ε¯
) , (11)
for ε¯ = ε/4.
4.3 Asymptotic optimality
We now show that the bound (11) is asymptotically optimal, i.e., that the right hand side of (11)
is (in an asymptotic sense) also an upper bound for the number of key bits that can be extracted
by any protocol. Consider a setting where both the initial information Z(n) as well as the ad-
versary’s state ρ(n) consist of many independent pieces: For n ∈ N, let Z(n) = (Z1, . . . , Zn) and
ρ
(n) = ρ1⊗· · ·⊗ρn where (Zi,ρi) are independent pairs with identical probability distribution
P(Zi,ρi) = P(Z,ρ). Let s(n) be the length of the key S that can be extracted from Z
(n) by an
optimal privacy amplification protocol. Using Lemma 2.5, we conclude from (11) that
s(n) ≥ H(Z(n)|ρ(n)) + o(n) (12)
where, for any Z¯ and ρ¯, H(Z¯|ρ¯) is defined by
H(Z¯|ρ¯) := S([{Z¯} ⊗ ρ¯])− S([ρ¯]) .
Let now S := F (Z(n)) be a key of length s(n) computed by applying any random function F
to Z(n). It is a direct consequence of Definition 3.1 that the key S can only be ε-secure with
respect to ρ(n) ⊗ {F} (for ε approaching 0 as n goes to infinity) if
s(n) ≤ H(F (Z(n))|ρ(n) ⊗ {F}) + o(n) . (13)
Note that the quantity H(Z¯|ρ¯) can only decrease when applying any function f to its first
argument, i.e., for any random function F chosen independently of Z(n) and ρ,
H(F (Z(n))|ρ(n) ⊗ {F}) ≤ H(Z(n)|ρ(n) ⊗ {F}) = H(Z(n)|ρ(n)) . (14)
Thus, combining (12), (13), and (14), we obtain an expression for the maximum number s(n)
of extractable key bits,
s(n) = H(Z(n)|ρ(n)) + o(n) .
In particular, the maximum rate R := limn→∞
s(n)
n
at which secret key bits can be generated,
from independent realizations of Z about which the adversary has information given by ρ, is
R = S([{Z} ⊗ ρ])− S([ρ]) = H(Z|ρ) . (15)
This fact is already known for the special case where the adversary’s information is purely
classical. Indeed, if the adversary’s knowledge about each realization of Z is given by a real-
ization of a random variable W , expression (15) reduces to the well-known classical result
R = H(ZW )−H(W ) = H(Z|W )
(see, e.g., [20] or [21]).
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4.4 Applications to QKD
Theorem 4.1 has interesting implications for quantum key distribution (QKD). Recently, a
generic protocol for QKD has been presented and proven secure against general attacks [5].
Moreover, it has been shown that many of the known protocols, such as BB84 or B92, are special
instances of this generic protocol, i.e., their security directly follows from the security of the
generic QKD protocol. Since the result in [5] is based on the security of privacy amplification,
the strong type of security implied by Theorem 4.1 immediately carries over to this generic
QKD protocol. In particular, the secret keys generated by the BB84 and the B92 protocol
satisfy Definition 3.1 and thus provide universal composability.
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A Some identities
Lemma A.1 (Schur’s inequality). Let A be a linear operator on a d-dimensional Hilbert
space H and let λ1, . . . , λd be its eigenvalues. Then
d∑
i=1
|λi|2 ≤ tr(AA†) ,
with equality if and only if A is normal (i.e., AA† = A†A).
Proof. See, e.g., [22].
Lemma A.2. Let A be a normal operator with rank r. Then
tr|A| ≤ √r
√
tr(AA†) .
Proof. Let λ1, . . . , λr be the r nonzero eigenvalues of A. Since the square root is concave, we
can apply Jensen’s inequality leading to
tr|A| =
r∑
i=1
|λi| =
r∑
i=1
√
|λi|2 ≤
√
r
√√√√ r∑
i=1
|λi|2 .
The assertion then follows from Schur’s inequality.
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